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Abstract 
 
The Court of Appeal in England and Wales held (R. v. Sardar, 2012) there had been 
no exceptional circumstances which justified a jury retiring with a transcript of the 
complainant's interview. This paper reports an investigation into the impact multiple 
evidence forms and use of a judicial warning has on juror evaluations of a witness. 
The warning focuses juror attention on placing disproportionate weight on the 
evidence as opposed to their general impression of it. Sixty jury-eligible participants 
were presented with witness evidence in transcript, video, or transcript plus video 
format. Half the participants in each condition received the warning. All mock jurors 
completed a questionnaire which assessed perceptions of witness and task. Outcomes 
showed that transcript plus video evidence, when accompanied by a warning, did 
impact on mock jurors’ global assessments of the witness. The warning made the task 
less clear for jurors and, in the video condition, led to higher ratings of how 
satisfactory and reliable the witness was. Findings support the provision of a judicial 
warning to jurors and show some initial support for judiciary opposition to the 
provision of an additional transcript only when jurors are asked to make the more 
usual global witness assessments.  
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The Impact of Judicial Warning and Evidence Type on Juror Perceptions o  
of Global and Specific Witness Evidence 
 
The case of R. v. Sardar (2012) in England and Wales deemed a rape conviction 
unsafe as the jury had, without good reason, been provided with a transcript of the 
complainant’s video evidence-in-chief and, in addition, were permitted to keep it 
during deliberations. In this jurisdiction, complainant video evidence is that captured 
by Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) procedures (i.e., at police interview) which is then 
used as evidence in chief during trial. In addition, jurors were not warned of the risks 
of placing disproportionate weight on the transcript rather than forming an impression 
of the witness. The Court of Appeal concluded that the prosecution had likely gained 
an unfair advantage. The case of Sardar was guided by previous rulings that 
established transcripts of video evidence could only be used if they assisted jurors to 
follow the evidence, for example, if a witness has a strong accent or the audio quality 
was poor.1 Moreover, any evidence should be accompanied by a judicial warning (R. 
v Welstead, 1995; R. v Popescu, 2010).  
It is apparent this ruling was motivated by two key concerns; first, that 
transcript evidence will be given greater consideration than other trial evidence, and 
second, that jurors will focus heavily on a transcript rather than evaluating the witness 
more generally (i.e., globally). Specific witness attributes are those which are not 
                                                 
1 See also Minnesota State Bar Association General Rule 1:  Transcripts of audio recordings played during trial 
may be provided to the jury to help them understand what is said in the recording. The decision to furnish jurors 
with copies of a transcript to assist them in listening to the audio recording is subject to the sound discretion of the 
trial judge. The need to provide transcripts to the jury during audio playback is generally caused by two 
circumstances: (1) inability to understand a portion of the tape under the circumstances in which it will be 
replayed; (2) the need to identify the speakers, especially if two or more persons talk at the same time (the Hon. 
Alan Pendleton, see http://mnbenchbar.com/2015/07/using-transcripts-of-audio-recordings-during-trial/ accessed 6 
September, 2016. 
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considered global, for example, how accurate, confident or intelligent the witness 
might be. The latter point is of interest given that multimedia learning researchers 
have raised similar concerns arguing that individuals are more likely to attend to text 
than accompanying graphics (Clark & Mayer, 2011). Such assertions nevertheless 
lack empirical support, particularly as applied to the courtroom, since no research has 
investigated whether simultaneously presenting jurors with multiple forms of 
evidence has an effect on information-processes and thereby juror evaluations. 
Similarly, there is at present little empirical evidence to suggest that the provision of a 
judicial warning is a safeguard against bias.  
Against this backdrop, the present study aimed to examine the effects of 
multiple forms of evidence and judicial warning on juror perceptions of witness 
testimony. We outline the method employed in the study below but turn our attention 
first to judicial warnings. Given the universal use of warnings in legal contexts it is 
essential to consider whether warnings, as used in legal cases, are an adequate 
safeguard against bias.  
Despite an “entrenched belief” that judicial warnings are a successful method 
of educating jurors (Coyle & Thomson, 2014; p.8) research has returned mixed 
results. First, several studies have demonstrated that warnings encourage juror 
caution, as warnings about the reliability of eyewitness testimony results in fewer 
guilty verdicts (Greene, 1988; Katzev & Wishart, 1985; Paterson, Anderson, & Kemp, 
2013). Moreover, research shows that warnings can mitigate bias, including bias 
caused by the emotional expression of a witness or incorrect beliefs about non-verbal 
indicators of deception (Bollingmo, Wessel, Sandvold, Eilertsen, & Magnussen, 2009; 
Coyle & Thomson, 2014). These findings suggest that warnings can enhance juror 
performance and are an effective means of directing attention to appropriate factors 
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for consideration. It is of particular relevance for the case in point that warnings may 
affect the extent to which jurors focus on witness demeanour.  
In contrast, other researchers have reported that witness testimony warnings 
had no impact on verdicts or credibility ratings of a witness (Cutler, Dexter, & 
Penrod, 1990; Nikonova & Ogloff, 2005). In addition, judicial warnings have been 
shown to be ineffective against hindsight bias and coercion bias (Kamin & Rachlinski, 
1995; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981; Smith & Greene, 2005). Taken together this 
indicates the efficacy of judicial instructions is variable and may not always assist in 
the prevention of bias. Moreover, comprehension rates of jury instructions are often 
found to be low (Rose & Ogloff, 2001). More recent research for example has shown 
that even when most jurors report they comprehend judicial instructions only a small 
minority actually demonstrates a full understanding of those instructions (Thomas, 
2010). It is thus unclear from existing research whether a judicial warning will be 
successful in preventing bias, though it may encourage jurors to make more cautious 
ratings of the witness. 
The warning element is only one part of the story. Psychological perspectives 
relevant to information processing and cognition can also help to explain why when 
humans process and / or undertake complex or multiple tasks performance might 
diminish given the finite cognitive resources available. One concept underpinning the 
Sardar case is the assumption that jurors cannot attend to two forms of evidence 
effectively at the same time. Cognitive-load theory states that constraints on working 
memory and information-processing systems mean that humans have limited 
cognitive resources for performing tasks (Baddeley, 2003; Sweller, 1988). Such a 
theory accounts for when carrying out complex tasks or multiple tasks this can 
diminish performance given limited cognitive resources (Pashler, 1994; Wagstaff, et 
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al., 2007; Wheatcroft & Ellison, 2012).  Further, some researchers have proposed that 
individuals can be so limited at thinking and making inferences that mental shortcuts 
are often taken; that is they are miserly in their thinking (Fiske, 1995). As a result 
individuals under high cognitive-load may resort to heuristic processing and the use of 
cognitive shortcuts to simplify processing conditions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), for 
example, when processing two separate pieces of evidence. Although heuristics 
enhance the efficiency of everyday processing they may also increase the likelihood 
of biased judgements (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In addition to 
cognitive-load, Sedikides and Skowronski’s (1991) ‘law of cognitive structure 
activation’ [i.e., that ‘stimuli will be encoded as an instance of the structure that is 
most highly active in memory and the most semantically similar to the stimulus’ 
(p.1)] and Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) ‘least effort principle’ [i.e., that people have a 
tendency to use the most convenient search methods when seeking information in the 
least exacting way - stopping that search once an acceptable solution is found (for a 
review, see also Chaiken & Trope, 1999) may also have relevance in this complex 
context. Moreover, a neuropsychological-cognitive model proposed by Wagstaff, 
Wheatcroft, et al. (2007) suggests that technically difficult tasks might be facilitated 
more readily if unnecessary cognitive burdens can be reduced. Thus, Wagstaff et al.’s 
model helps to consider cognitive load relative to task difficulty in this multifaceted 
domain, both tasks which are more and less complex (Wheatcroft & Ellison, 2012).  
There exists persuasive evidence in the literature to demonstrate juror 
performance suffers under high cognitive-load. Psychological research into decision-
making processes and juror ability suggests that social-cognitive factors may be 
influential. Indeed, persuasive evidence in the literature shows juror performance 
suffers under high cognitive load. For example, jurors who must process greater 
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amounts of information in a trial have been shown to use heuristics, struggle to return 
appropriate verdicts, and even misinterpret evidence (Horowitz & Bordens, 2000; 
Horowitz, Bordens, Victor, Bourgeois, & ForsterLee, 2001; Horowitz, ForsterLee, & 
Brolly, 1997; Tamborini, Huang, Mastro, & Nabashi-Nakahara, 2007). Although one 
might argue these findings have limited ecological validity due to the use of mock 
juror paradigms, research with actual jurors has yielded similar results, with juror 
confidence decreasing as the amount of information to be processed increases (Heuer 
& Penrod, 1994). It is also possible that jury members are likely to be influenced by 
group processes activated during the deliberations that follow a trial. One influential 
theory of jury deliberation places story making as a central feature. Pennington and 
Hastie’s (1991) story model proposes that decision making by juries involves an 
active, constructive comprehension process in which information is moulded into a 
coherent mental representation: the story (Pennington & Hastie, 1992). The jury 
applies a ‘goodness of fit’ to the most acceptable version using principles of coverage, 
coherence, and uniqueness. Taken together findings demonstrate that jurors under 
high cognitive-load are more likely to be impaired in their ability to systematically 
process information and reach unbiased decisions, and theories support the contention 
that bias is likely to occur. 
A number of other factors may also increase cognitive-load and affect juror 
performance. Research has found that presentation of complex evidence triggers 
heuristic processing (Bourgeois, Horowitz, & ForsterLee, 1993) causing jurors to 
assess witnesses using peripheral cues, such as gender or credentials (Cooper, 
Bennett, & Sukel, 1996; Schuller, Terry, & McKimmie, 2005). Further, that the 
imposition of two concurrent cognitively demanding tasks increases jurors’ use of 
heuristics and disrupts information-processing (Kleider, Knuycky, & Cavrak, 2012; 
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Malavanti, 2012). Such disruption to processing may impact on juror confidence in 
own decision making. For example, Pennington and Hastie (1991) place emphasis on 
mental representations (i.e., the structure and content of processed information), and 
note that narratives are imposed on evidence (i.e., story model) as it is processed by 
jurors making decisions. Those stories may be more or less structured, and thereby 
more or less accessible, in ways that support more or less confidence expressed by 
those making assessments of the narrative, and which confidence rating is dependent 
upon the type of evidence medium used. The implication for the aforementioned legal 
case is that placing additional demands on jurors may have deleterious effects on their 
processing capabilities and subsequent considerations, including potential impact on 
juror confidence. 
Clearly, features of a task affect how jurors process and use information. 
However, evidence modality may also be relevant as auditory and visual information 
is processed by separate memory subsystems (Baddeley, 2000). This means that more 
information can be processed at once without causing cognitive overload if presented 
in a form which utilises both auditory and visual aspects, as each aspect is processed 
separately (Tindall-Ford, Chandler, & Sweller, 1997). Indeed, research has revealed 
that presenting information in multiple modalities reduces cognitive-load and 
improves recall compared to the use of a single modality (Cao, Theune, & Nijholt, 
2010; Penney,1989). The modality of evidence presentation may thus have 
implication for cognitive-load and hence how important evidence might be processed. 
Consistent with this approach are clear differences in how various modes of 
evidence are perceived by jurors. There is some aged evidence to suggest that jurors 
find transcript evidence less clear, more fatiguing, and more difficult to attend to than 
video evidence (Williams, Farmer, Lee, & Cundick, 1975). Findings accord with 
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modality explanation in the suggestion that processing transcript evidence, which uses 
only the visual channel, is more cognitively taxing than video evidence - where 
processing demands may be split across two channels. Moreover, these processing 
differences may affect how the evidence itself is perceived. Strömwall and Granhag 
(2002) found that participants provided with video evidence rated a witness account 
as more consistent, more complete, having greater logical structure, and containing 
richer detail than participants provided with transcript evidence alone. Lindholm 
(2005) also noted that video evidence yielded higher credibility ratings of a witness 
than transcript evidence. The studies carry an implication that witness evidence might 
be received more positively when presented in video form. However, the evidence is 
mixed. Pezdek, Avila-Mora and Sperry (2009) reported that witness evidence was 
rated less confusing, more informative, and more influential by jurors presented with 
a transcript compared to those assessing a video. Although this contradicts previous 
findings, it nonetheless demonstrates a distinction in juror perceptions of evidence 
presented in different forms. This may be partially attributed to cognitive-load; 
however, the absence of demeanour cues in transcript evidence may also contribute to 
this effect. We will return to the importance of demeanour later. 
Although adding additional modalities of evidence can help to relieve 
cognitive-load it may result in the opposite outcome if high demands are placed on 
one processing channel. In multimedia learning, the redundancy principle states that 
concurrently presenting individuals with graphics, audio narration and written text 
should be avoided as it can impair information-processing (Clark & Mayer, 2011). In 
these cases the text is redundant as it merely duplicates the spoken information, hence 
the visual channel is overloaded unnecessarily (Mayer, 2001). It is interesting to note 
that providing text is only recommended when the audio information is hard to 
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comprehend, mirroring the legal argument in the provision of transcripts of video 
evidence (see R. v. Popescu, 2010). 
The redundancy principle has received support from a number of studies. 
Homer, Blake and Plass (2008) identified that students who were given a video, audio 
track and slides of a lecture reported higher cognitive-load than those given only 
audio and slides suggesting assessing multiple forms of the same information is 
cognitively demanding and may affect information-processing. Indeed, a compelling 
body of research has demonstrated that learning is diminished in cases where 
redundant text is provided (Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller, 2004; Mayer, Heiser, & 
Lonn, 2001; Moreno & Mayer, 2002). At face value, these findings further support the 
idea that including additional modes of visual information may prove detrimental. 
Regardless, as with other explanations, not all research has shown the same 
pattern of results. Yadav et al. (2011) compared participants given narratives in text, 
video (including visual and auditory elements), or video and text format. Surprisingly, 
participants were more emotionally engaged with cases incorporating a video, yet no 
differences in the cognitive processing of the different presentation modes were 
found.  
For the judiciary the balance of findings suggest that simultaneous 
presentation of witness evidence to jurors in video and transcript form will lead to 
cognitive overload due to multiple demands on the visual channel and may therefore 
affect how evidence is processed and subsequent evaluations are made of witnesses 
by jurors. For example, high cognitive-load is associated with the use of heuristics by 
jurors (Kleider, et al., 2012) thus jurors may focus on peripheral cues such as 
demeanour rather than systematically assessing testimony content. It is here where the 
inconsistency between legal and psychological standpoints becomes apparent; 
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psychological literature suggests that jurors assessing multiple evidence forms will 
focus more on demeanour, whilst the judiciary assert that jurors will ignore 
demeanour and focus on the written word (R. v. Sardar, 2012). Such discrepancies 
highlight the need for empirical investigation. 
Despite the lack of clarity both disciplines seem to agree that jurors assessing 
multiple forms of evidence will differ from jurors provided with a single form of 
evidence in how much they attend to demeanour. Interestingly, the judiciary propose 
that the ability of jurors to consider witness demeanour is a key component of the oral 
evidence system and is essential for determining credibility (R. v. Sardar, 2012). 
Indeed, aspects of demeanour such as emotion, speaking style and eye gaze have all 
been shown to affect juror evaluations of witnesses (Golding, Fryman, Marsil, & 
Yozwiak, 2003; Hemsley & Doob, 1978; Ruva & Bryant, 2004); however, it should 
be noted that jurors often misinterpret the meaning of non-verbal behaviours 
(Blumenthal, 1993). Nevertheless, differences in how transcript and video forms of 
witness evidence are perceived (Lindholm, 2005) consolidate the view that cues of 
demeanour may well influence juror assessments. Thus, jurors evaluating both video 
and transcript evidence will form different opinions of a witness compared to jurors 
with only transcript or video evidence to consider. However, it is currently unclear if 
this will be the result of an increased or decreased focus on demeanour. 
Various cases show the judiciary hold strong beliefs about the effects of 
providing jurors with transcripts of video evidence (i.e., one should not do so without 
good cause), yet such assertions lack an evidential basis and may contradict some 
psychological approaches to the matter. This study will therefore investigate the 
perceptions of jurors when provided with simultaneous transcript and video evidence 
as opposed to video or transcript evidence alone. Psychological literature suggests that 
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the transcript may be a redundant information source which requires additional 
cognitive resources for processing, leaving fewer resources available for evidence 
evaluation. This may, in turn, affect how jurors process and ultimately perceive 
witness evidence. A further line of inquiry will explore the use of the judicial 
warning, currently used as a safeguard against bias, when providing jurors with 
multiple evidence forms. In doing so, it will explore the broader elements of cognition 
and the minutiae of evidence type and judicial warnings. With these considerations in 
mind and in accounting for variability in research findings the present study was 
designed to test some key hypotheses. 
 
1.  A judicial warning will encourage jurors to apply greater caution to 
assessments resulting in lower witness ratings across the range of 
measures. 
2. Jurors presented with video and transcript evidence forms will make 
different assessments of a witness, across the range of measures, 
compared to jurors presented with video or transcript evidence alone.   
  
3. Jurors assessing video and transcript (i.e., multiple) forms of evidence 
will be less confident in their witness ratings across the range of 
measures. 
4. a) Jurors will find the assessment of the witness task more confusing, 
dependent upon the evidence condition and the warning condition 
received, and, b) less clear, in light of those conditions.  
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Method 
 
Participants: Sixty jury eligible adult participants were recruited via a 
participation scheme, from the general population, and across a range of occupations 
(51.7% were students). All participants spoke English as a first language. The sample 
size was deemed appropriate for the study concerned and the analytic approach used. 
The overall sample consisted of 20 males and 40 females aged between 18 and 55 
years (M = 28.65, SD = 11.96). No inducements were provided to the participants, 
apart from in the case of students, who received course credit for experimental 
participation. 
  Design: The study used a 3 (evidence type: transcript / video / transcript + 
video) x 2 (judicial warning: warning / no warning) between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the conditions and assigned a 
participant number on arrival. 
 Materials: The stimuli used (i.e., video and transcript) was based on an 
adaptation of a real life interview which had been conducted with a real witness and 
who had provided evidence during a real case. The account was modified and 
anonymised to create a ten page verbatim interview transcript. An actor (playing the 
witness who recounts her experience of discovering an injured neighbour) thereby 
recreated the original transcript in video form. The thirteen minutes long video 
stimulus was used as one condition or in another condition; to accompany the written 
witness transcript, where appropriate in the design. The main body of the 
questionnaire consisted of 9-point Likert scales ranging from, for example, from 9 = 
‘extremely confident’ to 1 = representing ‘not at all confident’. A Likert scale was 
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deemed appropriate as it has been rated the easiest to use by respondents whilst also 
yielding adequate reliability and validity (Preston & Colman, 2000). In this respect, 
Section 1 of the questionnaire assessed both global (e.g., satisfactory and reliable) and 
more specific perceptions (e.g., accurate, clear, credible, intelligent, confident, truthful 
and likely to be lying) of witness performance, together with jurors’ own confidence 
in their assessments. In piloting the items two independent observers completed ten 
witness ratings. Inter-rater reliability is employed to assess the extent to which 
different judges or raters agree in their assessment decisions. It is particularly useful 
in this context where human observers may not necessarily interpret answers the same 
way; i.e., raters may disagree as to how well certain responses or materials 
demonstrate the skill being assessed. The inter-rater reliability was sufficient to 
proceed with the main data collection (.762). Section 2 measured how clear and 
confusing the jurors found the task. Section 3 comprised several free narrative 
questions where participants had the opportunity to provide more detailed information 
about their experience of the task and factors which had influenced their judgements. 
These aspects provided some additional information to the main analysis. 
 Procedure: Following allocation, participants were briefed as to the nature of 
the study (i.e., to contribute to understandings of the ways in which jurors might 
perceive evidence during court processes). In doing so, participants read an 
information sheet and if each was happy to continue provided consent prior to random 
assignment to one of the experimental conditions. Participants were then informed 
that they would observe a video of a witness providing evidence before being asked to 
complete a questionnaire. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the three 
conditions.  
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  Before receiving the evidence, those in the ‘warning’ conditions were verbally 
warned by the researcher to: “Be aware of the danger of placing disproportionate 
weight on the evidence, as opposed to your general impression and assessment of it.” 
The warning is one guided by the Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Sardar (2012) in 
how judges may use a warning to provide guidance to jurors in the assessment of 
evidence. Participants were presented with the witness evidence for a total of thirteen 
minutes; either in transcript, video, or transcript + video form. After considering the 
evidence all participants completed the questionnaire which assessed personal 
perceptions of the witness and task. 
  On completion of the questionnaire, a debrief session took place where 
participants were given the opportunity to ask questions about the research and 
thanked for their participation. Briefing material adhered to British Psychological 
Society ethical principles relevant to the research (2006); in particular, by informing 
participants that they could at any time ask to withdraw either themselves or their data 
from the study. 
  
Data Analysis 
A series of 3 (evidence type: transcript / video / transcript plus video) x 2 (judicial 
warning: no warning / warning) independent ANOVAs were conducted on the scores 
for witness satisfaction, reliability, credibility, accuracy, clarity, intelligence, 
confidence, truthfulness and lying, and juror confidence, task clarity and task 
confusion (see Tables 1 and 2). 
 
Satisfactory Witness 
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There was no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54)=.03, η2=.00, p>.05, or warning, 
F(1,54) = .12, η2= .00, p>.05, on how satisfactory the witness was rated by jurors. 
However there was an interaction between evidence type and warning, F(2,54)=6.42, 
η2=.19, p<.01. Further investigation of this interaction revealed that in the video 
condition, jurors given a warning (M=5.40, SD=1.27) rated the witness significantly 
more satisfactory than jurors without a warning (M=3.60, SD=1.65), t(18)=2.74, 
p<.017. Additionally, when a warning was provided, jurors evaluating transcript + 
video evidence (M=3.60, SD=1.35) rated the witness less satisfactory than those using 
video evidence alone (M=5.40, SD=1.27), t(18)=3.08, p<.017. The results partially 
support H1. No other comparisons reached significance, p>.017.  
 
Witness Reliability 
No main effect of evidence type F(2,54)=.15, η2=.01, p>.05, or warning, 
F(1,54)=1.88, η2=.03, p>.05, was observed for reliability ratings. Nevertheless an 
interaction between evidence type and warning was identified, F(2,54)=4.29, η2=.14, 
p<.02. Post-hoc tests revealed that within the video only condition, the witness was 
rated more reliable by jurors given a warning (M=4.40, SD=1.35), than those without 
a warning (M=2.60, SD=1.27), t(18)=3.08, p<.017.  The remaining comparisons were 
not significant, p>.017. The results partially support H1. 
 
 
Witness Credibility 
There was no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54)=.63, η2=.02, p>.05, or warning, 
F(1,54)=.03, η2=.00, p>.05, on juror ratings of witness credibility. No interaction was 
present, F(2,54)=.93, η2=.03, p>.05. The findings provide no support for H1 and H2. 
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Witness Accuracy 
 
There was no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54)=.06, η2=.00, p>.05, or warning, 
F(1,54)=1.46, η2=.03, p>.05, on perceived witness accuracy. The interaction was not 
significant, F(2,54)=2.16, η2=.07, p>.05. Again, outcomes indicate no support for H1 
and H2. 
 
Witness Clarity 
No main effect of evidence type, F(2,54)=.19, η2=.01, p>.05, or warning, 
F(1,54)=1.30, η2=.02, p>.05, was observed for ratings of witness clarity. The 
interaction was not significant, F(2,54)=.58, η2=.02, p>.05. The outcomes show no 
support for H1 and H2. 
 
Witness Intelligence 
There was no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54)=.56, η2=.02, p>.05,  or warning, 
F(1,54)=.87, η2=.02, p>.05, on ratings of witness intelligence. Although an interaction 
between these factors was reported, F(2,54)=3.48, η2=.11, p<.05, post-hoc 
comparisons were all found to be non-significant at the prescribed level, p>.017. H1 
and H2 are unsupported in respect of this measure. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Witness Confidence 
A main effect of evidence type was observed for ratings of witness confidence, 
F(2,54)=6.41, η2=.19, p<.01. Tukey comparisons showed that jurors in the transcript 
condition (M=2.90, SD=1.37) rated the witness significantly less confident than jurors 
JUDICIAL WARNING AND EVIDENCE EFFECTS ON JUROR PERCEPTIONS  
 18
in the video (M=4.20, SD=1.88; p<.05) and transcript + video conditions (M=4.60, 
SD=1.54; p<.01). Although the transcript + video condition yielded the highest 
confidence rating, the difference between the video only and transcript + video 
conditions was not significant, p>.05. There was no main effect of warning, 
F(1,54)=.03, η2=.00, p>.05; though the interaction showed a trend toward significance 
F(2,54)=2.95, η2=.10, p=.06. The results on this measure provide partial support for 
H2. 
 
Witness Truthfulness 
For ratings of truthfulness, no main effect of evidence type, F(2,54)=.42, η2=.02, 
p>.05, or warning, F(1,54)=.03, η2=.00, p>.05, was observed. The interaction was 
non-significant, F(2,54)=.11, η2=.00, p>.05. No indication of support for H1 and H2 
is shown. 
 
Witness Lying 
A main effect of evidence type was identified for jurors’ ratings of the likelihood that 
the witness was lying, F(2,54)=3.98, η2=.13, p<.05. Tukey comparisons revealed that 
jurors in the transcript + video condition (M=4.00, SD=1.21) rated the witness more 
likely to be lying than jurors in the transcript condition (M=3.00, SD=1.12), p<.05. 
There were no significant differences between the ratings of jurors in video and 
transcript + video conditions or video only and transcript only conditions, p>.05. 
There was no main effect of warning, F(1,54)=1.71, η2=.03, p>.05, or an interaction, 
F(2,54)=1.71, η2=.06, p<.05. The results provide partial support for H2. 
 
Juror Confidence 
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There were no main effects of evidence type, F(2,54)=1.03, η2=.04, p>.05, or 
warning, F(1,54)= .00, η2=.00, p>.05, on jurors’ ratings of their own confidence. The 
interaction was not significant, F(2,54)=.70, η2=.03, p>.05. The outcome on this 
measure provides no support for H3. 
 
Juror Task Clarity 
There was no main effect of evidence type on how clear jurors rated the task, 
F(2,54)=1.24, η2=.04, p>.05. However a main effect of warning was observed, 
F(1,54)=6.51, η2=.11, p<.02. This demonstrated that providing jurors with a warning 
(M=6.33, SD=1.61) yielded lower ratings of task clarity than not presenting a warning 
(M=7.33, SD=1.40). The interaction was not significant, F(2,54)=.26, η2=.01, p>.05. 
The results provide partial support for H4.  
 
Juror Task Confusion 
 
A main effect of evidence type was detected for jurors’ ratings of how confusing the 
task was, F(2,54)=4.53, η2=.14, p<.02. Tukey comparisons showed that the task was 
rated less confusing when jurors were given both transcript + video evidence 
(M=2.10, SD=1.02), compared to video evidence alone (M=3.40, SD=1.54), p<.02. 
None of the other comparisons differed significantly, p>.05. There was no main effect 
of warning, F(1,54)=.55, η2=.01, p>.05, or a significant interaction, F(2,54)=1.26, 
η2=.05, p>.05. The results provide partial support for H4. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Correlations 
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Pearson’s correlations were conducted on the data and those of relevance are reported. 
A positive correlation was found between perceived confidence and accuracy of the 
witness (r = .138, p>.05) whilst a negative correlation existed the more confident the 
jurors the less confusing they thought the task was (r = -.329, p<.02). However, juror 
ratings of how confusing they found the task did not significantly correlate with any 
of the witness ratings (all p>.05).  
 
Narratives 
Table 3 demonstrates some of the key themes which emerged as being important for 
jurors’ assessments of the witness. It is worthy of note that the number of jurors 
mentioning these elements appears to be broadly similar across the different 
conditions. For brevity, only the experimental conditions and themes of interest are 
reported here.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Discussion 
The principal aims of the study was to examine judicial warnings as legal 
mechanisms and the effects of different evidence types on a range of juror 
assessments of a witness together with the potential for impact on jurors’ self-ratings 
in the assessment process. In summary, the first hypothesis, that the provision of a 
warning would encourage caution in juror assessments resulting in lower witness 
ratings, the second; that jurors presented with different evidence forms will make 
different witness assessments across a range of measures, and fourth; that jurors will 
find the assessment of the witness task more confusing and less clear, dependent upon 
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the evidence condition and whether a warning is given or not, were all partially 
supported. Broadly speaking, the provision of the judicial warning resulted in juror 
ratings of the witness as more satisfactory and reliable. Providing jurors with the 
warning also revealed lower ratings for task clarity. In terms of evidence type, jurors 
provided with the transcript rated the witness significantly less confident. 
Furthermore, jurors assessing the witness using multiple evidence forms rated the 
witness more likely to be lying. For jurors themselves, the task was rated less 
confusing when both transcript and video were provided. The third hypothesis, 
however, that jurors in assessing multiple forms of evidence will be less confident in 
their ratings of the witness, was unsupported. We now turn our attention a more 
detailed consideration of the findings. 
 
Judicial Warning 
The most striking finding was that when jurors were presented with a judicial warning 
the witness was rated less satisfactory by the juror group considering both transcript + 
video evidence compared to those with video evidence alone. This outcome lends 
partial support to H1, and H2; that jurors who consider multiple evidence forms 
would rate witnesses differently from jurors who have access to a single form of 
evidence. The effect only occurred when jurors were given the warning which 
suggests the judiciary is justified in concern of cases where warnings are not provided 
to jurors due to the potential effect on how jurors may perceive evidence. Further, as 
jurors who are permitted access to a transcript ought to be provided with a warning, 
the finding that juror assessments are affected by the combination of a warning and 
multiple evidence forms is of great relevance for any legal system which uses juries. 
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The literature which surrounds cognitive-load may extend an explanation of 
the finding and of particular relevance are the ways in which information is managed. 
Theory suggests that processing both transcript + video evidence places higher 
demands on jurors’ available cognitive resources (Mayer, 2001); a problem which 
may have been exacerbated in this case by the additional processing requirements of a 
warning placed upon assessors. Wagstaff et al.’s (2007) cognitive neuropsychological 
theory of facilitation and inhibition suggests that more complex tasks require greater 
cognitive effort and thereby activate executive and frontal systems with potential to 
err as a result of lowered processing capacity. Moreover, inhibition of more 
appropriate outcomes may also be influenced and result in defaults to more autonomic 
responses that require little in the way of cognitive work (Fiske, 1995). Those 
undertaking processing of both transcript + video evidence thus likely need to work 
much harder minimizing the ability to ‘free up’ capacity in the brain to process 
information. Either that, or individuals may be miserly in their thinking (Fiske, 1995). 
Indeed research tells us that simultaneously performing two tasks impairs 
jurors’ information-processing and encourages heuristic processing (Kleider et al., 
2012; Malavanti, 2012). So, the processing strategies of jurors assessing multiple 
evidence forms together with a warning may have been similarly affected. For 
example, jurors could heuristically rate the witness as less satisfactory due to the 
demands inherent within the task. In the complex context of the courtroom, mental 
shortcuts, which can often help to streamline information in daily activities, can be 
detrimental and lead to less effective outcomes (Wheatcroft & Ellison, 2012). 
Notwithstanding the replication of this finding, it has practical implications for the 
legal system. Jurors’ rating of how satisfactory they believe witnesses to be is a more 
global assessment of the witness. Thus, judicial bodies may be right to avoid 
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providing transcripts to jurors when making such appraisals. This is of particular 
significance given that jurors in the courtroom are encouraged to form general (i.e., 
more global) opinions of witnesses (R. v. Sardar, 2012).  
Further evidence that the provision of a warning affected global ratings of the 
witness was found within the video condition. Jurors given the warning rated the 
witness as more satisfactory and reliable than those who did not consider a warning. 
This outcome contradicts the hypothesis (H1); that the warning would encourage 
caution in juror assessments, resulting in lower witness ratings. Moreover, it does not 
support studies which have shown that warnings make jurors more sceptical of all 
witnesses (Greene, 1988; Katzev & Wishart, 1985). Instead, it seems the warning 
might have been successful in directing jurors to develop an overall impression of the 
witness. According to Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) people tend to use the most 
convenient search methods when seeking information and stopping that search once a 
solution is found which is acceptable. In mental shortcut terms the warning then has 
acted as a signal to directing attention helping in the increased access to resources that 
appears to have helped jurors cognitively process information more readily without 
potentially overloading central and frontal mechanisms. Taken together, the warning 
given yielded more positive witness ratings despite the fact it reminded jurors to be 
cautious in making assessments. Overall, this might be thought of as a reassuring 
result as judicial warnings which simply make jurors sceptical of all witnesses may 
serve to unfairly disadvantage reliable witnesses (Paterson et al., 2013). Further, the 
findings reiterate the importance of providing a warning to jurors even when video 
evidence is presented alone. On the face of it, in the current case, not presenting a 
warning would have been detrimental in terms of how reliable and satisfactory jurors 
rated the witness. Such an outcome thereby supports the judicial position on the 
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importance of legal warnings and the relevance of their application. Plus, as the 
warning appears to affect global, rather than specific, evaluations of the witness it 
may be useful to develop judicial warnings to encourage jurors to consider how 
satisfactory and reliable they find the witness. 
In addition, mock jurors rated the task less clear when a warning was provided 
for consideration and accords with existing literature which has demonstrated jurors 
often struggle to comprehend judicial warnings (Rose & Ogloff, 2001; Thomas, 
2010), providing some support for H4. Again, as noted earlier, both process and 
application of a warning is intuitively complex and thereby cognitively demanding 
(Wagstaff et al., 2007). Although warnings are an essential part of legal proceedings 
the findings here show the judiciary must remain cautious in the presentation of 
warnings as it is clear how the task is perceived by jurors could lead to heuristics 
being applied to the processing task. As a result, the enhancement of judicial warnings 
to minimise the imposition of cognitive load must be researched in greater detail. In 
doing so, one may also draw upon the recommendation made to direct jurors towards 
assessments of satisfaction and reliability.  
Further, the constitution of the jury is such that other factors, such as the age, 
gender, ethnicity, attractiveness, or even the reputation of the judge may have a role to 
play. However, the inclusion of these elements was beyond the scope of this study. 
What can be said is that as the judicial direction is toward jurors it is less likely the 
reputation of the judge would be known to those lay persons in the court. 
Investigation into the relevance of age, gender, ethnicity and attractiveness however 
may well make for interesting findings.  
We turn our attention to those findings which relate to evidence type. 
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Evidence Type: Video, Transcript, and Video plus Transcript 
The second key area of interest was the consideration of the effects of 
providing jurors with multiple forms of evidence. Although transcript + video 
evidence affected global assessments of the witness when accompanied by a judicial 
warning many of the hypothesised differences between transcript + video evidence 
and other evidence types failed to emerge for specific assessments of witness 
performance. 
Contrary to H2, juror ratings of how accurate, clear, credible, truthful, and 
intelligent the witness did not differ significantly across the various evidence 
conditions. Unlike research from other contexts which has demonstrated multiple 
forms of information placed a greater cognitive-load on participants (Homer, et al., 
2008) this was not found here. The reasons for this cannot be established; however, it 
may indicate that jurors made efforts to attend to the particular form, and in doing so, 
narrowed the search for evidence to apply their ratings. Moreover, there may be 
limitations in comparing a student to a juror, as, in the case of a student one requires a 
certain amount of cognitive need to learn whereas in the case of assessing a witness a 
juror’s cognitive capabilities are based on central or peripheral abilities together with 
motivation to process the information. This could well form the basis for further 
empirical investigation to provide a meaningful comparison. 
Although the findings do not support literature which has identified 
differences in jurors’ credibility ratings of transcript + video evidence (Lindholm, 
2005) it is consistent with researchers who have found no differences in the cognitive-
processing of narratives presented in different forms (Yadav, et al., 2011). The 
contradictions illustrate the complexities involved in research of this kind; that the 
findings in this field can be mixed and that cognitive-load explanations may not 
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necessarily be applicable to, or across, all contexts. Indeed, the skills individual jurors 
bring to dealing with cognitive loads may well be differential and is a clear area of 
expansion which requires further research. 
Nevertheless, the most noteworthy point is that supplying a transcript 
alongside video evidence did not affect jurors’ specific ratings of the witness. Judicial 
concern about the provision of additional transcript evidence is mitigated for specific 
witness assessments. Nonetheless, jurors tend not to make specific assessments of 
witnesses but instead evaluate them in a global, more general, fashion. Given this, any 
tendency to recommendation against additional transcript evidence would remain 
valid.   
Drawing upon comments made by jurors in the free narrative section of the 
questionnaire appeared to support the finding that juror perceptions of video and 
transcript + video evidence were not as different as expected. Two main ideas 
appeared to inform juror assessments; these were ‘consistency of witness testimony’ 
(e.g., how well the witness restated and repeated key information) and ‘non-verbal 
factors’ (e.g., body language, appearance, tone of voice). The comments accord with 
research which reports that testimony consistency and witness demeanour influence 
juror evaluations (Berman & Cutler, 1996; Ruva & Bryant, 2004). Most importantly, 
the number of jurors commenting on these factors was similar across video and 
transcript + video conditions suggesting the presentation of multiple evidence forms 
did not differentially affect the types of cues attended to by jurors. Further, that juror’s 
in the transcript + video condition made reference to non-verbal factors indicates 
these jurors did not necessarily, as the judiciary suggest, apply more consideration to 
the written transcript. While encouraging from a legal standpoint it is important to 
acknowledge that witness demeanour can be misleading as jurors often hold 
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inaccurate beliefs about the meaning of non-verbal behaviours (Blumenthal, 1993). 
The judiciary should therefore be mindful of the potential limitations of judgements 
based on demeanour cues. Nevertheless only a small number of jurors in each 
condition identified demeanour as influential in their assessments which suggests 
mock jurors in this study attended to a number of different factors rather than 
appraising non-verbal factors alone. Taken together, it seems jurors assessing multiple 
evidence forms based their assessments on the same factors as jurors evaluating only 
video evidence.  
Even when an effect of evidence type was observed for specific witness 
evaluations, differences were not detected between the video and transcript + video 
conditions. Jurors rated the witness as more likely to be lying when presented with 
transcript + video evidence, as opposed to transcript evidence alone. Such a finding 
offers partial support for H2 as it demonstrates that juror ratings did vary across 
evidence conditions - albeit not for the conditions necessarily of interest to the 
judiciary. Whilst this may indicate that jurors assessing transcript + video evidence 
were able to attend to cues beyond the transcript the relevance of the finding is largely 
limited; given that transcripts alone do not tend to be used as the sole method of 
witness evidence presentation in court, notwithstanding certain witnesses who may be 
classed vulnerable. The important outcome was that jurors in the video and transcript 
+ video conditions did not differ in their perceptions that the witness was lying - 
adding to the notion that providing transcripts alongside video evidence does not 
affect more specific ratings. 
Similarly, transcript evidence yielded lower ratings of witness confidence than 
video or transcript + video evidence. The ratings of transcript + video evidence 
differed from transcript, but not video evidence. This may well indicate it was 
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important for jurors to be able to visually assess the witness as jurors with only 
written information returned lower ratings of witness confidence. Importantly, for 
judiciaries, juror ratings of witness confidence were consistent across video and 
transcript + video conditions. The outcome contributes to the idea that specific 
assessments of the witness remain unaffected by the conditions presented here. With 
regard to the relationship between confidence and accuracy, no correlation was 
observed between perceived confidence and accuracy of the witness (.138). 
Interestingly, this contradicts research which has shown jurors often judge more 
confident witnesses as more accurate (Brigham, 1990; Penrod & Cutler, 1995). In 
context, this could be viewed positively given that the most confident witness is not 
necessarily the most accurate (Wheatcroft & Woods, 2010).  
The study also explored the impact of evidence type on jurors’ own 
confidence in ratings made and found the method of evidence presentation had no 
effect on juror confidence. This contradicts the prediction that jurors assessing 
multiple evidence forms would be less confident in own assessments (H3) and does 
not necessarily support previous literature (Heuer & Penrod, 1994). It is nevertheless 
encouraging that juror confidence remained stable across all evidence conditions as 
overconfidence has been associated with inaccurate responses in previous research 
(Wheatcroft, Wagstaff & Kebbell, 2004). Neither did the addition of a transcript 
adversely increase or decrease juror confidence. An interesting finding was that the 
more confident jurors were, the less confusing they rated the task (r = .329); so, those 
who were higher in confidence seem, overall, less affected by task complexity. In 
sum, although the provision of transcript evidence has other detrimental effects, it 
does not appear to manipulate juror confidence.  
JUDICIAL WARNING AND EVIDENCE EFFECTS ON JUROR PERCEPTIONS  
 29
 Turning to jurors’ perceptions of the task itself, the hypothesis (H4); that 
multiple evidence forms would make the task more confusing and less clear was 
partially supported. Whilst evidence type had no impact on jurors’ perceptions of task 
clarity, jurors rated the task as less confusing when assessing both transcript + video 
evidence, compared to video evidence alone. Consistent with this, several jurors 
reported that the transcript + video were “helpful when combined” and “helped to 
understand the evidence of the witness much more easily”. Although these comments 
provide an interesting insight they cannot be considered representative of the 
experiences of all mock participants, nor indeed all jurors. Furthermore, this outcome 
does not undermine the recommendation that transcript + video evidence should not 
be presented to jurors, as it is relevant only to jurors’ own perceptions of the task, 
rather than appraisals made of the witness. 
On balance, it appears that differences in jurors’ perceptions of the task did not 
translate into differences in ratings of the witness as no differences between evidence 
conditions for specific assessments of witness performance were found. Further, 
jurors’ ratings of how confusing they found the task did not correlate with any of the 
witness ratings (p>.05). In contrast to studies which have demonstrated jurors are 
often influenced by psychological factzors, such as emotions and attitudes (Bornstein, 
1998; Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989), these findings suggest jurors were able to 
separate feelings about the task from perceptions of the witness. Thus jurors may be 
better equipped to perform the role than some research has previously suggested. Of 
course, no research is without its limitations. First, the sample may not have been 
representative of the general jury-eligible population due to the prevalence of student 
participants, which may limit the generalizability of findings. Thus, the sample size 
may be a limitation which could have impacted upon the statistical power of the 
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study. Nevertheless, the outcomes may have been enhanced had a larger sample been 
available. Second, the study lacks some ecological validity, particularly as jurors only 
assessed evidence of a single witness. In reality, a feature of real trials is that jurors 
would be required to assess evidence across multiple witnesses. The research would 
benefit from investigating this factor, bearing in mind witnesses in actual trials will be 
dependent upon judges and magistrates exercising vigilance and intervening on rule of 
law where appropriate. Jurors were also required to make their judgements in 
isolation, which neither reflects the true experience of jurors nor provides insight into 
the effects of multiple evidence forms on juror deliberation. Having said this, Meyers, 
Brashers and Hanner (2000) observed in mock juries that the position favoured prior 
to group discussion becomes the final verdict approximately 90 percent of the time.  
On the question of method, obviously the experimental design used here 
cannot reflect the full range of variables present in a real trial situation. Nevertheless, 
it could be argued that ecological validity was enhanced by a) the use of a real case 
transcript and b) the use of an actress in the witness video condition, to reflect more 
accurately the ways in which information is presented. On the other hand, real 
testimony does have important consequences. At the same time, the real trial context 
could exaggerate the findings of this study, with jurors finding greater difficulty in 
their comprehension of questions as a result of the greater cognitive burdens alluded 
to above. Future research should nevertheless seek to address these issues and explore 
whether the findings can be replicated using a more representative sample and in 
conditions, where possible, of greater ecological validity. Research may also be 
advised to investigate the validity of demeanour cues for jurors’ assessments of 
witnesses with particular reference to the global-specific dimension identified in this 
paper. 
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Conclusion 
The study showed mock jurors’ global assessments of a witness were significantly 
affected by the presentation of transcript + video evidence in conjunction with a 
judicial warning. Conversely, specific assessments of the witness and task were 
unaffected by the addition of a transcript; however, this is perhaps less important 
given that jurors tend to, and are directed to, make global appraisals of witnesses. 
Taken together, the findings provide some empirical support for the judiciary’s 
leaning toward the opposition of transcript use and the assertion in R. v. Sardar (2012) 
that there were “serious errors both in letting the jury see the transcript… and in 
failing to direct to them as to the dangers of giving disproportionate weight to the 
transcript” (p. 4). Notwithstanding replication of these outcomes it seems that jurors 
who must assess witnesses in a global fashion ought not to be provided with the 
accompanying transcript. Findings also emphasise the importance of providing jurors 
with a warning should video evidence be presented alone. Finally, the judiciary might 
develop warnings to encourage jurors to consider how satisfactory and / or reliable 
they find witnesses. 
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